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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KANAB CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs
Case Number 20070768

JEFF POPOWICH,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT. IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE. AND ORDER OF
PROBATION DATED October 5, 2007, THE HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER, SIXTH
DISTRICT COURT. SANPETE COUNTY, UTAH, PRESIDING
ARGUMENT
I. MR. POPOWICH HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO RULE
24(a)(9) Utah R. App. P.
Counsel for the City indicates that Mr. Popowich failed to marshal despite the statements
found on pages three and four of Mr. Popowich" s Brief. The City contends there are two lines that
were not added to that statement. Therefore, according to the City, that equals a failure to marshal
all of the evidence. Counsel for the City then points to the transcript page thirty-seven, lines
seventeen through nineteen. A question was asked and answered in the affirmative by the Defendant
(if his girlfriend's dogs were ever in his home for three or more days at a time.) Mr. Popowich did
not specifically cite to that question and answer in the marshaling section. However, on page four
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of his Brief Mr. Popowich cites the Court to Addendum 5, which is Mr. Popowich's entire
testimony. Counsel for the City points to this one question and one response and characterizes it as
an egregious offense.
Counsel then goes on to say that the second failure of Mr. Popowich is that he "makes the
marshaling statement without giving indication of which findings might be supported by the
evidence and demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient as to any particular finding by failing
to ferret out the fatal flaw in the evidence." Clearly, Mr. Popowich's arguments, both in his
summary and in the extended arguments in his Brief, spell out for both counsel and the Court which
findings are supported by the evidence and demonstrating that all of the evidence was insufficient.
Mr. Popowich has marshaled the evidence both in the spirit and by the letter of the law.
II. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY DECLINED TO GRANT MR. POPOWICH'S
MOTION TO DISMISS.
The City argues that it did not have to prove a negative, i.e. that the exceptions to the
Ordinance need not be proven by the City. Even if counsel is correct and the exceptions are merely
affirmative defenses that could have been raised by Mr. Popowich, Kanab City Ordinance 13200.02.010 Licensing, reads in relevant part:

Any person owning a dog within the city limits shall license the dog pursuant to the
following provisions:
A. Licensing, Fees and Registration.
1. Registration - - Required - - Dogs only. It is unlawful for any person to own keep
or harbor a dog over the age of three months within the limits of this city without
making application to the city for that purpose and paying to the city an annual
registration fee.
No evidence was shown in the City's case in chief that Mr. Popowich kept the dogs, or
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harbored the dogs. Under Kanab City Ordinance 13-200.01.010 Definitions:

"Owner" means any person, partnership or corporation owning, keeping or harboring
one or more animals. An animal shall be deemed to be harbored if it is fed or
sheltered for three consecutive days or more.
The fact that the City did not show in its case in chief that any of the dogs observed by the
animal control officer were observed in that house three consecutive days is sufficient to dismiss the
charges for failure to carry their burden of showing that Mr. Popowich was the owner. It is not
harmless error, except from the City's perspective. The evidence of keeping is not present either,
as the animal control officer did not observe Mr. Popowich (or any other person) at the home, ever.
(See Transcript at f 19, lines 18-21.)
As to the kennel charge under section 13.200.04 Kennels et sec, the City never provided any
information that the home was in a residential agricultural district, nor did it enter any evidence as
to the house being 200 feet away from any neighboring house, or 150 feet from any road. In fact,
there is no showing that Mr. Popowich was trying to run a kennel, only that to "keep" more than two
dogs would require a kennel license.
When the Court did not rule on the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Defendant was left
with no choice but to take the stand and testify truthfully, which he did. At that point he had to
testify against himself and he answered honestly that the dogs had been there three or more
consecutive days. The Court was in error in ruling that there was & prima facia case showing that
the Defendant kept the dogs and operated a kennel prior to his testimony.
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III. MR. POPOWICH HAS MET HIS BURDEN TO ESTABLISH THAT THE
ORDINANCES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Mr. Popowich agrees that the presumption of validity applies to all statutes and ordinances
passed. Mr. Popowich's analysis is not muddled if the City would look at the arguments presented.
This is a due process claim. The threshold issue that is involved in Mr. Popowich's substantive due
process challenge, is a property interest subject to constitutional protections such as property interest
in Mr. Popowich's land, home and contents of the home. Mr. Popowich has a substantive due
process right to not have the government come onto his land, into his house, or take his property, be
they dogs or any other property, without due process. (See Utah Constitution Article I, § 14 and the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.) This governmental action is arbitrary, is
without a rational basis and does shock the conscience. Mr. Popowich is not complaining about the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others, but is claiming this vagueness as applied
to him.
In uncontroverted testimony, Mr. Popowich indicated that the requirement for a dog license
or a kennel license in the year 2006 required that his home be allowed to be searched with no
limitations upon the government as to the time, scope, or nature of those searches. The Ordinance
in 2007 was changed and Mr. Popowich licensed his two dogs at that point.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

Jeff, Fd like to draw your attention towards the, ah, issue of a kennel license.
Would you tell the Court if you ever applied for a kennel license in 2006.
I did not.
Why - - why did you not do that?
Because in 2006 you were required to sign a piece of paper consenting for
searches of your house. And I didn't feel that was right, so I didn't license
my two dogs.
Well, Fm talking about the kennel. Fm not talking about the dogs.
4

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

That was for any dog license.
For any dog license. For a kennel license - Right.
- - or a dog license.
Um-hm.

(See Transcript at f 35, lines 20-25 and ^ 36, lines 1-9.)
The issue in this case and with this Ordinance, is not the health standards that counsel refers
to, but the undefined ability for law enforcement to search a home without notice or without probable
cause, by signing the license. Notably, that unfettered search wording in the Ordinance was removed
in the 2007 version of the City Ordinance.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the City still has not and cannot show sufficient legal or factual evidence on
why this Court should not overturn the decision of the trial Court. There was insufficient evidence
presented in the City's case in chief to support the case going forward. Directed verdict should have
been granted. The case should be remanded with an order to dismiss this case. In the alternative,
the Court should remand this case to the District Court with an order to dismiss counts 3, 4 and 5,
for failure, at the end of the trial, to convict Mr. Popowich beyond a reasonable doubt on those
counts. In the third alternative, the Court should remand this case to the District Court with an order
to dismiss count 5, due to the fact that Kanab City's Kennel Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague
as applied to the facts of this Defendant.
DATED this 29th day of April, 2008.

ic Cramer
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
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ADDENDUM 1

Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized

ADDENDUM 2

Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

